Monday, August 02, 2004
Maternal-fetal conflict, Texas style.
(a) A person commits an offense if the person knowingly delivers a controlled substance listed in Penalty Group 1, 1-A, 2, or 3 or knowingly delivers marihuana and the person delivers the controlled substance or marihuana to a person:It would be a stretch to apply this section to a pregnant woman who ingests cocaine and thereby "delivers" the controlled substance to her fetus, except for the fact that the 78th Texas Legislature passed S.B. 319 in 2003, which amended the definition of "person" in the Texas wrongful death statute and the Penal Code to include "an unborn child at every stage of gestation from fertilization until birth." The Legislature was careful, in amending both statutes, to make it clear that the new definition does not apply if the harm to the fetus is the result of conduct by the mother.
(1) who is a child . . . .
(c) An offense under this section is a felony of the second degree.
(d) In this section, "child" means a person younger than 18 years of age. . . .
What am I missing here? First, the Legislature did not amend the Controlled Substances Act's definition of "child" to include an unborn child. So the amendments to the Wrongful Death Statute and Penal Code should be beside the point.
Second, with respect to the only Penal Code provisions that could conceivably apply to the alleged conduct (in addition to the Controlled Substances Act in the Health & Safety Code) -- which would include assault, endangering a child, and deadly conduct -- the Legislature made it clear that the new definition does not apply when the dangerous or harmful conduct is the mother's.
So if the 2003 change to the definition of "individual" doesn't apply, and the Legislature did nothing that would expand upon the class of protected persons in H&S Code § 481.122, this prosecution comes down to the now widely rejected theory that a woman can unlawfully "deliver" a controlled substance to a fetus prenatally. As terrible as it is for a woman to take cocaine while pregnant, there are plenty of good policy arguments against prosecuting a woman who does.
For health care providers, however, the Potter County DA's interpretation of the Controlled Substances Act is an ominous one. Reportable child abuse under chapter 261 of the Texas Family Code includes the following:
(I) the current use by a person of a controlled substance as defined by Chapter 481, Health and Safety Code, in a manner or to the extent that the use results in physical, mental, or emotional injury to a child; [or]It also includes
(J) causing, expressly permitting, or encouraging a child to use a controlled substance as defined by Chapter 481, Health and Safety Code.
(B) causing or permitting the child to be in a situation in which the child sustains a mental or emotional injury that results in an observable and material impairment in the child's growth, development, or psychological functioning; [or]If any of these forms of abuse can be directed at an "unborn child," then physicians, nurses, and others who know the child tested positive for cocaine at birth have an obligation to inform Child Protective Services or local or state law enforcement authorities (Family Code § 103). This is a drastic expansion of current legal duties and would appear to fly in the face of the Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Ferguson v. City of Charleston.
(C) physical injury that results in substantial harm to the child, or the genuine threat of substantial harm from physical injury to the child, including an injury that is at variance with the history or explanation given and excluding an accident or reasonable discipline by a parent, guardian, or managing or possessory conservator that does not expose the child to a substantial risk of harm.
I repeat: What am I missing?