The piece is written by Clayton Dalton, identified as an ER physician in New Mexico. His personal website has links to other published essays, including a bunch of New Yorker articles. If you're not a subscriber to the magazine, he might have the ECMO piece posted on his website sometime soon.
Judge Zahid Quraishi of the District of New Jersey issued summary judgment against J&J’s Janssen and BMS, dismissing their claim that the Medicare Drug Price Negotiation Program was an unconstitutional taking of their assets.
“In short, Defendants are not taking drugs from Plaintiffs,” Quraishi wrote in his 26-page ruling, according to multiple news outlets. “Selling to Medicare may be less profitable than it was before the institution of the Program, but that does not make Defendants’ decision to participate any less voluntary.”
BMS has already appealed the ruling to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Endpoints News reported.
The BioSpace piece has a nice summary of the various attempts by Big Pharma to mount challenges against the program. And a comprehensive discussion of the program was posted this morning in The Washington Post (possibly one-time free access). See also Reuters,
The district court's opinion is here.
For just a flavor of the principal dissenting opinion, try this:
I respectfully dissent. The Equal Protection Clause does not license judges to strike down any policy we disagree with. It instead grants the states leeway to tailor policies to local circumstances, while providing a carefully calibrated remedy for truly illicit discrimination. No such discrimination appears in these cases. North Carolina and West Virginia do not target members of either sex or transgender individuals by excluding coverage for certain services from their policies. They instead condition coverage on whether a patient has a qualifying diagnosis. Anyone—regardless of their sex, gender identity, or combination thereof—can obtain coverage for these services if they have a qualifying diagnosis. And no one—regardless of their sex, gender identity, or combination thereof—can obtain coverage if they lack one. There is therefore nothing about these policies that discriminates on the basis of sex or transgender status.
This is truly "Alice Through the Looking Glass" stuff.
The real question is what the Supreme Court will do when it gets its hands on this issue. That is a question, right? And not a foregone conclusion?
Until today.
And I'm not posting about poetry -- at least not only about poetry -- but also about poetry criticism -- and not about the work of all poetry critics, but about one in particular.
Professor Helen Vendler
(April 30, 1933 - April 23, 2024)
You could say that as a one-time, part-time poetry columnist for the Dallas Morning News from 1998-2003, I was once in the same line of work as Helen Vendler. That's about as accurate and helpful as saying a cockroach and a lion are the same because they both have legs.
Helen Vendler was a much-honored Harvard Professor of English and American Literature and Language. Her awards were many and her books even more so. I never read a Vendler piece without feeling glad that I had. According to Wikipedia, "In 2006, The New York Times called Vendler 'the leading poetry critic in America,'" and even her critics would have been hard-pressed to disagree. She was a traditionalist, which made her controversial in some circles, and that probably appealed to my own taste in poetry.
The death notices and appreciations are starting to pile up, though I fear most of these links are behind a firewall. Even better, check out a book by Vendler and dip in. It will be a great trip.
Highlights of the rule (from the fact sheet):
“The Federal Trade Commission’s decision to ban employer noncompete agreements across the economy is not only unlawful but also a blatant power grab that will undermine American businesses’ ability to remain competitive.“Since its inception over 100 years ago, the FTC has never been granted the constitutional and statutory authority to write its own competition rules. Noncompete agreements are either upheld or dismissed under well-established state laws governing their use. Yet, today, three unelected commissioners have unilaterally decided they have the authority to declare what’s a legitimate business decision and what’s not by moving to ban noncompete agreements in all sectors of the economy.“This decision sets a dangerous precedent for government micromanagement of business and can harm employers, workers, and our economy.“The Chamber will sue the FTC to block this unnecessary and unlawful rule and put other agencies on notice that such overreach will not go unchecked.”
For the record, the FTC sees the situation differently:
Noncompetes restrict the freedom of American workers and suppress wages.
- Noncompetes restrict workers’ fundamental freedom to leave for a better job or to start their own business.
- In many cases, noncompetes are take-it-or-leave-it contracts that exploit workers’ lack of bargaining power and coerce workers into staying in jobs they would rather leave, or force workers to leave a profession or even relocate.
- By restricting workers from moving freely, noncompetes prevent workers from accepting higher-paying jobs.
- Noncompetes even reduce the wages of workers who aren’t subject to noncompetes. Noncompetes stifle new businesses and new ideas.
Noncompetes restrict the freedom of American workers and suppress wages.
- Noncompetes prevent workers from starting their own firms and block new businesses from hiring qualified workers.
- Noncompetes restrict the flow of knowledge between firms, and studies have found that noncompetes reduce innovation. This affects not just workers but also consumers by depriving consumers of better products and lower prices that result from competition and innovation.
Noncompetes are widespread throughout the U.S. economy.
- Roughly one in five Americans, totaling nearly 30 million people, are subject to noncompetes.
- The Commission received over 26,000 comments, with thousands of workers describing how noncompetes blocked them from taking a better job, negotiating better pay, or starting their own business.
- The Commission also heard from entrepreneurs and small businesses who said noncompetes prevented them from starting new ventures or hiring knowledgeable workers to help grow their businesses.
- Over 25,000 commenters supported a categorical ban on noncompetes.
By banning noncompetes, the FTC estimates that:
- New business formation will grow by 2.7%, creating over 8,500 new businesses each year.
- American workers’ earnings will increase by $400-$488 billion over the next decade, with workers’ earnings rising an estimated $524 a year on average.
- Health care costs will be reduced by $74-$194 billion over the next decade in reduced spending on physician services.
- Innovation will increase, with an average estimated increase of 17,000-29,000 more patents each year over the next decade.
Herein the sermon endeth.
If your eyes started to glaze over while you read that first paragraph, you're likely to be in good company. Understanding what palliative care is about, what it can and cannot accomplish, like most things worth doing in life, is best understood through the stories of patients, various health care professionals, families, administrators, etc.
Fortunately there is a book that does just that, bringing to life the practice of palliative care and in doing so bringing us to a deeper understanding of what palliative care seeks to accomplish and how. I am thinking of The Pursuit of Life: The Promise and Challenges of Palliative Care, a collection of essays edited by my SMU colleague (in Perkins School of Theology) Jack Levison and my long-time collaborator and friend, Bob Fine. You can read about it on the BMJ Supportive and Palliative Care blog and if you are moved to do as I did, you can purchase a copy over at Amazon.
Individual refusals are stunningly heartless:
One woman miscarried in the lobby restroom of a Texas emergency room as front desk staff refused to check her in. Another woman learned that her fetus had no heartbeat at a Florida hospital, the day after a security guard turned her away from the facility. And in North Carolina, a woman gave birth in a car after an emergency room couldn’t offer an ultrasound. The baby later died. . . .
Consider what happened to a woman who was nine months pregnant and having contractions when she arrived at the Falls Community Hospital in Marlin, Texas, in July 2022, a week after the Supreme Court’s ruling on abortion. The doctor on duty refused to see her.
“The physician came to the triage desk and told the patient that we did not have obstetric services or capabilities,” hospital staff told federal investigators during interviews, according to documents. “The nursing staff informed the physician that we could test her for the presence of amniotic fluid. However, the physician adamantly recommended the patient drive to a Waco hospital.”
Ethics. “It is shocking, it’s absolutely shocking,” said Amelia Huntsberger, an OB/GYN in Oregon. “It is appalling that someone would show up to an emergency room and not receive care -- this is inconceivable.” Why is this happening?
Pregnant patients have “become radioactive to emergency departments” in states with extreme abortion restrictions, said Sara Rosenbaum, a George Washington University health law and policy professor.
“They are so scared of a pregnant patient, that the emergency medicine staff won’t even look. They just want these people gone,” Rosenbaum said.
Law. Aren't the refusals of pregnancy-related emergency care illegal? Well, the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Pregnancy Act requires Medicare-contracted hospitals to stabilize the emergency medical condition when a woman comes to the emergency department in labor. It's a Condition of Participation in the Medicare program. It shouldn't be complicated, but it is.
On Wednesday, April 24, the Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in the case of Moyle v. United States, No. 23-726, in which the issue is "[w]hether the Supreme Court should stay the order by the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho enjoining the enforcement of Idaho’s Defense of Life Act, which prohibits abortions unless necessary to save the life of the mother, on the ground that the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act preempts it." There are 45 amicus briefs in this case, an indication of the broad and strong interest in this case on both sides of the issue. (The district court's order in unpublished but can be found at pages 620-59 of Vol. 2 of the Joint Appendix filed in the Supreme Court matter.)
Mrs T was a 58-year-old female admitted to the intensive care unit (ICU) for respiratory distress secondary to pneumonia. On her 10th day of hospitalization, she developed septic shock. Despite escalations in care, it became clear Mrs T would not survive. After a goals-of-care conversation with her husband, her 2 adult children, living outside of the state, were called to come to say their goodbyes. With both children at bedside, a woman wearing scrubs and a long white coat walked into the room and announced, “I’m Dr A, an ICU resident.” She explained the medical data and summarized to the family that “the patient has no chance of survival.” Although this statement was objectively correct, it failed to acknowledge that “the patient” was also a community advocate for equitable education, a wife of 40 years, a lover of mischief, and my mom. . . .
I was not surprised to hear about her poor prognosis. But I was surprised at Dr A’s choice to call my mom the patient. Is this how everyone is told their best friend was going to die? How could my mom be just the patient if her fingernails were still painted with Christmas trees and snowflakes?
There's more to savor and learn from this short essay. It's about the dehumanizing effect of the language of medical encounters. "Dr. Jones" becomes simply "the resident," and Dr. Smith is "the attending." "Mrs. Thure" is stripped of personhood and is "the patient." As the author writes: "When we choose not to use someone’s name, we are choosing to reduce them. We are indirectly saying, 'You are no more than the one-word descriptor I have given you.' The patient is not a human but just a pathology needing to be addressed."
Ms. Thure (Class of 2024 in UCLA's medical school) doesn't oversimplify:
Years later as a medical student, I was taught to think about patients both holistically and also to reduce them to a one-liner. There is clinical significance to having an accurate, concise depiction of a patient’s history and current medical needs. There is also equal clinical significance to remembering the person behind the one-liner.
What defines the distance between these two descriptions? Empathy. Or maybe simply circumstances:
Over the years, I have spent a fair amount of time trying to figure out how my mom became the patient. Maybe Dr A was at the end of a long and difficult shift, maybe that was not the first bad news she had delivered that evening, maybe she was never trained to be empathetic, maybe it is just the culture of medicine. Or maybe there was no reason at all.
Tomorrow is the last meeting of this semester's edition of "Law, Literature & Medicine." It's a seminar for 4th-year med students (UT-Southwestern) and 3rd-year law students (SMU/Dedman) that I have taught for decades, since 2017 with my valued friend and co-teacher, Dr. Reeni Abraham. I will propose that we email the class a PDF of Ms. Thure's essay and discuss whether it should be included in the first day's reading assignment when we offer the course again in 2025. The course is about the language we professionals use, identity (our patients' and clients' and our own), narratives, and empathy. And it's all here in this wonderful little essay.
Part of the Fund’s ongoing series examining state health system performance, Advancing Racial Equity in U.S. Health Care: The Commonwealth Fund 2024 State Health Disparities Report evaluates states on 25 measures of health care access, quality, service use, and health outcomes for Black, white, Hispanic, American Indian and Alaska Native (AIAN), and Asian American, Native Hawaiian, and Pacific Islander (AANHPI) populations.
Among the key findings:
The health care divide is especially stark when it comes to premature deaths: American Indian and Black people die from preventable and treatable causes at substantially higher rates than other groups.
Disparities exist even in states that are otherwise considered high performing on health care.
Health care experiences for people of color vary widely across states. For example, health systems in South Dakota, North Dakota, and Alaska perform worst for American Indian people, while North Carolina’s health system performs best.
Find out where your state ranks, and how we can achieve more equitable health care systems in each state.
“It’s shameful that law-enforcement officials are choosing to persecute teens trying to live their lives, just to score points with far-right activists. . . ."
Wyden's comments were part of a series of public statements around the release of a staff report from the Senate Finance Committee, which Wyden chairs. The report discusses concerns about the actions of four attornes general in the context of:
Recent articles in both the mainstream media as well as medical and scientific literature have brought public attention to the traditional practice of allowing practitioners or supervised medical, advanced practice provider, or other applicable students to perform pelvic and other invasive examinations on patients who are under anesthesia. With this attention, patient advocates, physicians, and the students themselves have expressed concern about whether patients, especially anesthetized patients, have been sufficiently informed about this practice and whether their full consent was obtained before these educational exams were performed.
[My additional note: Anyone who has spent time with third- and fourth-year medical students is likely to have heard about unconsented-to pelvic exams performed on unconscious patients for training purposes.]
While CMS recognizes that these patient exams are often conducted as part of the vital skills clinical students must obtain during their training and education, we also firmly believe that patients have the right to make informed decisions on the healthcare services they receive so that they can give their full consent for those services including any training- and education-related examinations that may be performed in addition to any treatments or procedure that they expect to receive, especially if those patients will be under anesthesia at the time.
Therefore, we are revising our interpretive guidance in the State Operations Manual (SOM), Appendix A for hospitals at tag A-0955, to include under the example of a properly executed and well-designed informed consent form, as well as the hospital’s policy and process for informed consent, the following elements (in addition to those outlined above) [new guidance in italics]:
• Whether physicians other than the operating practitioner, including, but not limited to, residents, medical, advanced practice provider (such as nurse practitioners and physician assistants), and other applicable students, will be performing important tasks related to the surgery, or examinations or invasive procedures for educational and training purposes, in accordance with the hospital’s policies. Important surgical tasks include: opening and closing, dissecting tissue, removing tissue, harvesting grafts, transplanting tissue, administering anesthesia, implanting devices, and placing invasive lines. Examinations or invasive procedures conducted for educational and training purposes include, but are not limited to, breast, pelvic, prostate, and rectal examinations, as well as others specified under state law.
While CMS understands that the performance of such examinations has been necessary for teaching medical and other students critical clinical examination skills, we believe that patient permission for these exams is an essential part of the informed consent process for hospitals, and necessary for compliance with the informed consent requirements in the CMS hospital CoPs. [Footnotes omitted.]
Practice pointer: Tell the student/trainee about the informed-consent process that preceded the training session. I've been told by more than one attending physician that the patient's consent was obtained before the training session. If nothing is said to the student/trainee, they may conclude (erroneously) that the patient's consent wasn't obtained.
The ACA certainly enjoys substantial public support. Krugman points to a graphic from the Kaiser Family Foundation:
The newsletter is worth reading, but "fair use" dictates that I share only a little of Krugman's take on the ACA's success:
In any case, Obamacare has worked. It didn’t provide universal coverage, but it did provide health insurance to millions of Americans, some of whom desperately needed that safety net — and it did so without breaking the bank. Predictions that the A.C.A. would be unworkable have been proved wrong.
This paragraph ends with a warning:
At this point, the only serious threat the program faces — and it is a serious threat — is political: People who kept insisting, wrongly, that health reform would die of its own accord may simply step in to kill it.
Touting this as one of the biggest Medicare fraud cases ever, the press release on this case described the essentials of the scheme (emphasis added):
Chmiel’s charges were brought in 2019 as part of Operation Brace Yourself, an investigation that originated in South Carolina. Operation Brace Yourself, which was prosecuted in conjunction with the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division Fraud Section, was a multi-jurisdictional investigation that involved the execution of more than 80 search warrants in 17 federal districts.
As for Chmiel’s criminal conduct, evidence presented to the court showed that Chmiel controlled and operated at least 10 DME companies, which were located throughout the United States. These DME companies were used by Chmiel and his co-conspirators to submit false and fraudulent claims to Medicare for braces that were not medically necessary and/or were obtained through the payment of kickbacks and bribes.
To effectuate the scheme, these DME companies entered into agreements with an offshore call center to purchase completed doctors’ orders so the DME companies could bill Medicare. This offshore call center was advertising through television and internet advertisements. Once a Medicare beneficiary called a 1-800 number that was on the advertisements, that Medicare beneficiary would be screened for eligibility and then convinced that he or she needed a brace, and oftentimes upsold on other braces. The call center would then contact a telemedicine company whose physician and/or or nurse practitioner would issue a prescription without regard to the medical necessity. Throughout the investigation the evidence revealed that beneficiaries were prescribed braces without ever being examined by, seeing, or, in some instances, even speaking to a medical professional. Evidence presented showed that Chmiel was attempting to hide that he was purchasing completed doctors’ orders by creating fraudulent and false invoices for alleged marketing and business processing services.
Throughout the health care fraud scheme, Chmiel’s companies, which included 10 DME companies, two dropship companies, and two additional companies that were used to facilitate the fraud – D.O. Delivery and Pain Center – billed Medicare in excess of $200 million and Medicare paid Chmiel’s companies in excess of $95 million.
For the past two decades, durable medical equipment has been a fertile field for fraud and, correspondingly, for federal fraud prosecutions. The perpetrators of these schemes apparently fail to take into account the investigatory tools available to the Department of Justice and the fact that the government has computers that can crunch a lot of Medicare claims. $200 million worth of DME orders from 10 DME companies was bound to be picked up by some computer's filter or algorithm.
Note first the weasel words in my description of the Chevron doctrine:
4. Respondent next argues (Br. 48-50) that this Court does not owe deference to ATF’s interpretation under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). But as the government has explained (Br. 43), it does not seek any such deference here because ATF’s regulation is not a legislative rule carrying the force and effect of law; instead, it is simply an interpretive rule announcing ATF’s understanding of the statute. That should be the end of the matter. See HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining v. Renewable Fuels Ass’n, 141 S. Ct. 2172, 2180 (2021) (“ ‘[T]he government is not invoking Chevron.’ * * * We therefore decline to consider whether any deference might be due its regulation.”) (citation omitted).
Probably the best cases for a showdown over Chevron's continued existence involve a regulation involving fisheries, as discussed in a free article in JAMA posted to its website today:
Two cases currently before the US Supreme Court, Loper Bright Enterprises v Raimondo and Relentless, Inc v Department of Commerce, could potentially lead to the end of Chevron. Six commercial fishing ventures have challenged a rule requiring that fishermen pay the cost of government-approved observers who guard against illegal overfishing. Although the lower courts in both cases upheld the regulation under Chevron, the fisheries contend that the rule and Chevron itself are threatening the way of life for small, family-owned businesses. Justice Gorsuch was receptive, expressing concern during oral arguments that Chevron places a thumb on the scale in favor of the government at the expense of “the immigrant, the veteran seeking his benefits, the Social Security Disability applicant, who have no power to influence Agencies.” Justice Kavanaugh, meanwhile, noted that the historic role of the judiciary has been “to police the line between the legislature and the executive to make sure that the executive is not operating as a king,” seemingly implying that Chevron places agencies in the position of royalty.
Why does JAMA care? Because of the critical role of the federal government, acting through agency rules and decisions, to protect the health of the public:
From health care to climate change, federal agencies were created to marshal the resources and power of the government to improve the lives of individuals in the US. A longstanding pillar supporting these agencies, a legal doctrine called Chevron deference, grants them flexibility in carrying out their mandates to maximize policy impact and keeps them nimble amid changing circumstances. Now, a majority of the US Supreme Court, led most vocally by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, appears poised to overturn this bedrock principle. The loss of Chevron could exalt policy choices made by judges over the expertise-based decisions by executive agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
Until they weren't.
As new technologies and high-priced drugs and devices drove up the cost of health care, insurers looked for ways to control the amounts they paid out in claims. Under the broad banner of "managed care," insurers instituted various reforms that fundamentally changed the delivery of health care goods and services.
One reform was to create panels or networks of approved providers, in exchange for which the insurance companies demanded deep discounts in physicians' fees and hospitals' charges. Patients who received their care -- even emergency care -- from providers who were "out of network" typically received no coverage for that care or reduced coverage, putting more of the cost of care on patients (i.e., the insurers' customers).
Another reform was the integration of health insurance and healthcare provider. The purest form of this were the HMOs. Some provided health care services to their insureds; others contracted with providers to diagnose and treat their insureds. In both instances, a single entity was financially (and legally and ethically) obligated to write health insurance policies and provide care (either directly or indirectly) to their insureds.
A third reform relates to the title of this post: prior authorization, to which I would add concurrent authorization. "Prior authorization" gives the insurance company up-front veto power over referrals to specialists or for hospitalizations, for prescriptions for drugs and devices, and for procedures (diagnostic (CT scans, e.g.) or treatment (including surgeries). "Concurrent authorization" gives insurance companies the same type of veto power throughout a course of treatment. This might be denial of a request for an MRI to see whether or how much a disease has progressed or denial of a request for an additional number of days of hospitalization to deal with post-procedure complications. And "retroactive review" -- which, under indemnity plans, were relatively benign efforts to determine medical appropriateness and necessity -- became a more rigorous process of "retroactive authorization."
Although managed care was originally justified as a necessary form of cost control, including screening insurance claims for those that were not for medically necessary appropriate care, managed care itself evolved into something that was increasingly regarded as abusive. The pattern of denying coverage for unarguably necessary and appropriate care produced a backlash over the past two decades, including legislative and regulatory reforms at the federal and state level to address the worst features of managed care.
A recent opinion video on the New York Times website (Mar. 14, 2024; subject to paywall) provides excellent evidence that insurance companies continue to use prior and concurrent authorizations to to delay or avoid altogether their contractual obligation to pay for care that is necessary and appropriate. (I can provide free access to eights readers of this post; if you want access, just let me know at tmayo@smu.edu.)
A handful of states have passed "gold card" laws that are intended to allow physicians who have successfully received prior authorizations to bypass that process altogether. According to the Texas Medical Association, two years after passage of the state's "gold card" law, "the Texas Department of Insurance (TDI) reports that only 3% of physicians and health care professionals have received gold cards because of the current eligibility threshold, which requires physicians to submit a minimum of five eligible prior authorization requests for a given health care service or medication within the six-month review period."
A federal version of the gold card law -- H.R. 4968, "Getting Over Lengthy Delays in Care As Required by Doctors Act of 2023" (or the "GOLD CARD Act of 2023") -- was referred last July 23 to the Subcommittee on Health of the House Ways and Means Committee, where it remains to this day. Even if it becomes law, exempts physicians from prior authorization requirements only under Medicare Advantage plans with respect to specific items and services if at least 90% of the physician's requests for such items and services were approved during the previous plan year. Outside of Medicare, patients and their providers would not be helped by the GOLD CARD Act.
Change Healthcare . . . processes 1 in 3 healthcare claims in the U.S. . . . The attack has crippled many operations for hospitals, insurers, physician practices and pharmacies across the country, with the American Hospital Association calling it the "most significant cyberattack" on healthcare in U.S. history.
The attackers (identified as the BlackCat Group) allegedly "stole 6 terabytes of data from Change, including medical records and Social Security numbers, and has since received $22 million in bitcoins, according to Reuters."
Getting back to business as usual is taking a lot of time:
As of March 7, Change Healthcare's pharmacy electronic prescribing is fully functional for claim submission and payment transmission. Change is expected to have its electronic payment platform available for connection March 15. Its medical claims network and software are expected to start testing for reconnection March 18, with the company working throughout that week to restore service.
Meanwhile, AP reports that "[t]he Office for Civil Rights said Wednesday that it also will examine whether Change Healthcare followed laws protecting patient privacy." The HHS press release (3/13/24) is here. It states in part (emphasis added):
The cyberattack is disrupting health care and billing information operations nationwide and poses a direct threat to critically needed patient care and essential operations of the health care industry.
OCR enforces the HIPAA Privacy, Security, and Breach Notification Rules, which sets forth the requirements that HIPAA covered entities (most health care providers, health plans, and health care clearinghouses) and their business associates must follow to protect the privacy and security of protected health information and the required notifications to HHS and affected individuals following a breach.
Ransomware and hacking are the primary cyber-threats in health care. Over the past five years, there has been a 256% increase in large breaches reported to OCR involving hacking and a 264% increase in ransomware. In 2023, hacking accounted for 79% of the large breaches reported to OCR. The large breaches reported in 2023 affected over 134 million individuals, a 141% increase from 2022.
The basic model would expand upon existing law in a bold way:
The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 eliminated marketplace premiums for eligible people with incomes below 150 percent of FPL. As a result, all individuals at that income level who live in states that have expanded Medicaid can now receive zero-premium coverage, unless they have an “affordable” offer from an employer or are excluded because of immigration status. If the remaining 10 states expanded Medicaid, or if eligible people with incomes below 100 percent of FPL in nonexpansion states were permitted to have subsidized coverage in the marketplace, then most legal residents with incomes below 150 percent of FPL could be covered with no premiums. Zero-premium coverage could also be extended to higher incomes, either through further enhancement of federal premium tax credits or by states adopting a Basic Health Program or adding state premium subsidies. [footnotes omitted]
Here's the Abstract:
Issue: The number of uninsured Americans remains stubbornly high, and many Americans do not obtain the coverage for which they are eligible — even when insurance is free.
Goal: To outline a system for automatically enrolling people with low incomes in health coverage and then model the impact on coverage and spending at the federal and state levels.
Methods: The Urban Institute’s Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model was used to analyze alternative auto-enrollment approaches. These include identifying uninsured individuals who are tax filers or recipients of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), unemployment insurance, or Social Security and enrolling people who are eligible for free coverage.
Key Findings and Conclusions: We show results for the nation and for three states (California, Georgia, and Michigan). If all states adopted an auto-enrollment policy for those with incomes at or below 150 percent of the federal poverty level, 4.3 million uninsured people would be identified and enrolled. An additional 1.8 million would be “deemed” covered, either auto-enrolled through provider contact or contingently covered and thus protected from huge medical bills. Provider spending on uncompensated care would fall 32 percent, while federal spending would increase by $30.3 billion and state spending would increase by $7.7 billion per year.
The individual mandate, however, does not regulate existing commercial activity. It instead compels individuals to become active in commerce by purchasing a product, on the ground that their failure to do so affects interstate commerce. Construing the Commerce Clause to permit Congress to regulate individuals precisely because they are doing nothing would open a new and potentially vast do-main to congressional authority.
Make a change to these sentences and you have the essence of the brief we can expect from opponents of automatic enrollment:
The individual mandate, however, does not regulate existing commercial activity. It instead compels individuals to become active in commerce by enrolling them in a product, on the ground that their failure to do so affects interstate commerce. Construing the Commerce Clause to permit Congress to regulate individuals precisely because they are doing nothing would open a new and potentially vast do-main to congressional authority.
In Sebelius Roberts saved the individual mandate by characterizing the penalty for not purchasing health care coverage as a tax. It would be a real stretch to characterize a free insurance policy as an exercise of the Taxing Clause. Would it fly under the Spending Clause?
By way of counter-argument, don't we already have a nationwide automatic-enrollment scheme for Medicare Part A? Would a broader scheme be any different?
1. Not-so-rare. This category includes fraud (against private insurers and public health programs like Medicare, Medicare, and Tricare); criminal prosecutions involving violations of the Anti-Kickback Law are announced by DOJ and state AGs every week (if not every day). Last Friday, for example, the Massachusetts Attorney General announced indictments against a dentist and his dental practice for billing the Medicaid program for services that were never rendered or were not rendered by the dentist. The charges included multiple counts of Medicaid False Claims and Larceny Over $1,200.
Violations of state and federal Controlled Substances Acts often have a provider -- a physician, nurse, or pharmacy worker -- with access to drugs in the middle of the scheme. A recent example comes from the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of New York. whose office announced on March 1 that a nurse practitioner received a 70-month sentence "for distributing controlled substances outside the course of professional practice and for no legitimate medical purpose." In her plea agreement, the defendant admitted that she
unlawfully prescribed controlled substances to a total of 54 patients. Simonson issued hundreds of unlawful prescriptions, including for the opioids hydrocodone and oxycodone, benzodiazepines (clonazepam, diazepam, and lorazepam), and the stimulants amphetamine (e.g. Adderall) and methylphenidate. For instance, Simonson admitted that she issued a total of 63 oxycodone prescriptions to two residents of Suffolk County, New York, without treating either of them for a medical condition. The Suffolk County residents usually paid Simonson by mailing her packages of cash concealed within DVD cases.
To settle the government's civil case against her, the defendant "admitted that she improperly prescribed controlled substances to 105 patients (including the 54 listed in her criminal plea agreement), often without ever examining patients and maintaining medical records justifying her decision to prescribe controlled substances."
2. Very rare. This category involves provider errors that result in iatrogenic injury. Most such cases, of course, are handled on the civil side by medical-malpractice and medical-negligence claims. In a small percentage of cases, though, a provider will be indicted. Most such cases involve extreme departures from the standard of care resulting in a patient's death. An example was reported by the NY Times earlier this month:
A Colorado paramedic convicted in the 2019 death of Elijah McClain, a young Black man whose case helped drive the national police reform movement, was sentenced on Friday to five years in prison.
The case was a rare criminal prosecution of emergency medical personnel, and stirred outrage among paramedics and firefighters across the nation who worry that urgent decisions made as part of their jobs can be criminalized.
The paramedic, Peter Cichuniec, 51, a former lieutenant with Aurora Fire Rescue, was convicted in December of criminally negligent homicide and second-degree assault for the unlawful administration of drugs. He was one of five police officers and paramedics prosecuted in state district court over three consecutive trials. . . .
In August 2019, Mr. McClain, a 23-year-old massage therapist, was returning home from a store when he was confronted by police who were responding to a 911 call about a suspicious person. During a quickly escalating encounter, Mr. McClain was forcefully restrained by police and placed in a carotid chokehold, a neck restraint that has since been banned in Aurora and other police departments. Paramedics then injected him with an overdose of the powerful sedative ketamine. He died in a hospital several days later.
