SCOTUS Upholds Tennessee's Prohibition Against Transgender Treatments for Minors

This morning the Court handed down its decision in United States v. Skrmetti, No. 23-477 by a vote of 6-3 along entirely predictable political lines. Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion, in which the Court held that the lower appellate court correctly applied the rational basis standard of review, rather than heightened judicial scrutiny of the Tennessee law. 

The Chief Justice described rational-basis review this way: "Under this standard, we will uphold a statutory classification so long as there is 'any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.'” He concluded that the Tennessee law "clearly meets this standard." Indeed, you can count on the fingers of one hand the number of Supreme Court cases in which the government's action failed the rational-basis test.

So the real battle in this case was over the correct standard of judicial review, an issue that is often -- as it was here -- dispositive, even if -- as it was here -- it was hotly contested. How wide and deep was the disagreement? Here's the lineup of opinions:

1. ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined, and in which ALITO, J., joined as to Parts I and II–B. 
2. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion.
3. BARRETT, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined.
4. ALITO, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. 
5. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which JACKSON, J., joined in full, and in which KAGAN, J., joined as to Parts I–IV. 
6. KAGAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 

Not quite a record,* but that's a lot of back-and-forth over the dividing line between rational-basis review and intermediate scrutiny: sex. If Tennessee's transgender treatment ban descriminates on the basis of sex, it should be subjected to heightened review. That's the issue underlying the Court's choice of judicial-review standard. I will leave it to you to review the debate that's spread across 118 pages. I'll add just a few notes from the opinions:

"An estimated 1.6 million Americans over the age of 13 identify as transgender, meaning that their gender identity does not align with their biological sex. See 1 App. 257–259; 2 id., at 827. Some transgender individuals suffer from gender dysphoria, a medical condition characterized by persistent, clinically significant distress resulting from an incongruence between gender identity and biological sex. Left untreated, gender dysphoria may result in severe physical and psychological harms." (Majority opinion) Including suicidal ideation. But, hey, the Tennessee legislature knows what's best for these minors.

"The United States asserted that “the medical community and the nation’s leading hospitals overwhelmingly agree” with the Government’s position that the treatments outlawed by SB1 can be medically necessary. Brief for United States 35; see also Brief for Respondents in Support of Petitioner 5 (asserting that “[e]very major medical association in the United States” supports this position). The implication of these arguments is that courts should defer to so-called expert consensus. . . . [T]here are particularly good reasons to question the expert class here, as recent revelations suggest that leading voices in this area have relied on questionable evidence, and have allowed ideology to influence their medical guidance." (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas offered three additional reasons to reject the expert opinion of "every major medical association in the United States," but this one is based upon Justice Thomas's medical opinion.

Justices Barrett and Alito hang their hats on their rejection of transgender as a "suspect class," the necessary predicate for heightened judicial review. Both compare the same characteristics of transgender persons as a class to the characteristics of approved suspect classes: sex, race, and national origin. Justice Both accept the assertion that transgender individuals face discrimination, which is one of the defining characteristics of a "suspect class." But Justice Barrett quite explicitly and Justice Alito more implicitly conclude it's not the right kind of discrimination. Private discrimination doesn't count; it has to be de jure discrimination. I'm not enough of a student of constitutional law to know whether this qualification is something new, but neither justice cites a case holding that only de jure discrimination counts in the determination of a "suspect class."

Justice Sotomayor cuts to the heart of the matter:

To give meaning to our Constitution’s bedrock equal protection guarantee, this Court has long subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny any law that treats people differently based on sex. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515, 533 (1996). If a State seeks to differentiate on that basis, it must show that the sex classification “serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Such review (known as intermediate scrutiny) allows courts to ascertain whether the State has a sound, evidence-based reason to distinguish on the basis of sex or whether it does so in reliance on impermissible stereotypes about the sexes. Today, the Court considers a Tennessee law that categorically prohibits doctors from prescribing certain medications to adolescents if (and only if) they will help a patient “identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor’s sex.” Tenn. Code Ann. §68–33– 103(a)(1)(A) (2023). In addition to discriminating against transgender adolescents, who by definition “identify with” an identity “inconsistent” with their sex, that law conditions the availability of medications on a patient’s sex. Male (but not female) adolescents can receive medicines that help them look like boys, and female (but not male) adolescents can receive medicines that help them look like girls.

Tennessee’s law expressly classifies on the basis of sex and transgender status, so the Constitution and settled precedent require the Court to subject it to intermediate scrutiny. The majority contorts logic and precedent to say otherwise, inexplicably declaring it must uphold Tennessee’s categorical ban on lifesaving medical treatment so long as “‘any reasonably conceivable state of facts’” might justify it. Ante, at 21. Thus, the majority subjects a law that plainly discriminates on the basis of sex to mere rational-basis review. By retreating from meaningful judicial review exactly where it matters most, the Court abandons

transgender children and their families to political whims.

In sadness, I dissent.