Indigent care: Texas Attorney General Op. No. GA-0198.

Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott issued an AG Opinion on indigent health care yesterday. It seems the Amarillo Hospital District sold its hospital, Northwest Texas Hospital, to Universal Health Systems of Amarillo, Inc., in 1996. UHS acquired, along with the hospital, the county's indigent-care obligations pursuant to Chapter 61 of the Health and Safety Act. Since then, UHS has noticed that some patients appear to have voluntarily waived their right to obtain employer-sponsored health insurance, preferring instead to obtain hospital services as indigent patients rather than as insured patients. UHS wanted to know whether they could require these patients to sign up for health insurance benefits with their employers so that UHS could obtain reimbursement for services rendered. The AG's answer, in a word, was "no." Here's the rationale:

In this case, the [Indigent Health Care and Treatment] Act does not contemplate that a health care provider may require an applicant for indigent health care to obtain insurance through the applicant's employer in certain circumstances. Section 61.007(5) of the Health and Safety Code, requiring an applicant to provide information regarding the "existence of insurance coverage," is phrased in the present tense. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 61.007(5) (Vernon 2001). It is concerned with an applicant's coverage at the time of the application, not the availability of coverage or the potential for coverage in the future. The Department's [i.e., the Department of State Health Services'] rule requiring an applicant to list information about any medical insurance household members "receive," see 25 Tex. Admin. Code § 14.101(a)(3)(E) (2004), similarly focuses on whether the applicant is insured at the time he or she applies for indigent health care. No other provision in chapter 61 of the Health and Safety Code or in the Department's rules expressly or implicitly authorizes a hospital district to require an applicant to purchase health insurance as a prerequisite to receiving indigent health care.

Moreover, absent a provision in the special law creating it, a hospital district has no authority to require an applicant to obtain insurance before the applicant is eligible for indigent health care. "A hospital district has only such authority as is expressly conferred on it by statute or necessarily implied from the authority expressly conferred to effectuate the express powers." Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JC-0068 (1999) at 1. Without express authority, a hospital district may not adopt a standard for determining an applicant's income and resources that is stricter than the Department's standard. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 61.052(a)(2) (Vernon 2001); see also id. § 61.052(e) (stating that, if the Department changes its income and resources requirements so that the hospital district's standards become stricter than the Department's, the hospital district must change its standard to at least comply with the Department's requirements). Because neither the statute nor the Department's rules permit a requirement that an applicant purchase insurance, any such hospital district requirement would be more restrictive than the state requirements and, absent express authority, would be impermissible under the statute.

Schiavo case on fast track to Florida Supreme Court.

The 2nd District Court of Appeal has approved Michael Schiavo's request that Jeb Bush's appeal go directly to the Supreme Court, which allows the litigants to bypass the intermediate appellate stage in the dispute over the validity of "Terri's Law," according to an article in the Tallahassee Democrat. Thanks to Kathy Cerminara for the heads up on this.

Meanwhile, Terri's parents are again contesting her husband's right to make medical decisions for her -- an issue that has been litigated and re-litigated and always comes out the same way every time - in favor of the husband. The Second District Court of Appeal's opinion from last June neatly summarizes the issue. Apparently "finality" is a foreign concept in Florida's court system.

For more on the lower court's opinion and other recent developments in this case go here and here.

Additional thoughts on late-term abortions.

If the Administration and Congress were serious about having a law that would pass constitutional muster, Pub. L. No. 108-105 needs only two simple changes. First, make it clear that the prohibition does not apply to any procedure that is performed before the fetus is viable. Second, include an exception so that the prohibition doesn't apply when it is necessary to protect the health of the pregnant woman. Both provisions are easy to write. Both come directly out of the Stenberg opinion, in which the Supreme Court struck down Nebraska's partial-birth abortion law because it failed to include these two provisions. And both would probably have increased support for the bill in Congress.

The absence of these two simple features suggests a number of possibilities:

• Maybe Congress and the Administration were more interested in a confrontation with the federal courts over partial-birth abortion than they were in enacting any meaningful legislation.


• Or perhaps Congress and the Administration were more interested in creating a campaign issue for the summer and fall of 2004 than they were in banning a procedure that is so rarely used but has such potent political symbolism.


• Finally, it is possible that the Administration and both houses of Congress truly believe that if this loose thread can be successfully pulled away from the body politic, the entire fabric of Roe v. Wade will surely follow.

Health insurance coverage and the kindness of strangers.

Health Affairs' May/June issue has an interesting article that show that workforce characteristics are a bigger influence on health care coverage rates than state health policies. Here's the journal's press release and summary:

Working In Communities With Greater Number Of ‘Advantaged’ Workers
Increases Likelihood Of Employer-Sponsored Coverage
BETHESDA, MD — Although there is wide variation across the country in the rate of employer-sponsored insurance, almost all of the variation can be accounted for by variation in individual demographic characteristics, employment characteristics, and a community effect, according to a new paper published today by Health Affairs and the California HealthCare Foundation.

Author Richard Kronick, a professor with the University of California, San Diego, and two colleagues use Current Population Survey data to demonstrate that community characteristics exert a strong “contextual effect” on employer-sponsored coverage. . . .

According to Kronick, all individual and job characteristics being equal, workers are more likely to receive employer-sponsored coverage in communities with a large proportion of high-income adults and greater numbers of manufacturing and public administration jobs, rather than those whose economy is weighted toward low-income adults, minority workers, and small-business jobs.

Kronick and colleagues conclude that the demographic characteristics of a community have more bearing on rates of employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) than do state policies aimed at reducing the number of uninsured, such as small-group market reform or elimination of benefit mandates.

“In almost all states the actual rate of ESI is within one or two percentage points of the level that would be expected based on demographic and employment characteristics and the contextual effect,” Kronick says.

“Other than Hawaii, there is very little that states have done to move the rate of ESI either substantially above or below the rate that would be expected based on the demographic and employment characteristics of the people who live in the state. The only effective action that any state has taken to substantially increase the level of ESI among workers is to require employers to offer insurance,” as Hawaii has, Kronick says.

The authors find that a worker with a given set of characteristics (age, race/ethnicity, income, family structure, size of employer, industry, health status, home ownership, and union membership) is 3.5 percentage points more likely to have employer-sponsored insurance if they live in a metropolitan area with a high-wage, high-skill economy than if the workers lives in an average metropolitan area.

“There is a strong contextual effect on coverage rates,” Kronick says. “Although there are wide variations across states in the rate of (employer-sponsored insurance), almost all of the variation can be accounted for by the combination of individual characteristics and the contextual effect.”

The authors offer three potential explanations for the “contextual effect”:

In areas where there are the types of workers who expect to have ESI (well-educated, higher-income, native-born Anglos), employers will be more likely to offer coverage. As a result, the search costs for a marginal worker to find a job offering insurance will be lower than in areas where there are fewer employers offering insurance

Total compensation, including ESI and other benefits, is more likely to higher in areas with larger numbers of higher-skilled workers

Workers in high-coverage areas may prefer to search longer for jobs with ESI, while workers in low-coverage areas may find it more acceptable to go without coverage

In other words, poorer and less urban states, with a less skilled workforce and fewer high-end and skilled jobs, can't do much to raise the rate of ESI, short of attracting more skilled jobs, more high-end employers, etc. And that means simultaneously granting tax breaks and spending more on improving public services, paying attention to public education and public health, all of which requires a stronger tax base. How does a comparatively poor state dig itself out of this hole?

The skewed politics of assisted suicide.

Liberals touting states' rights. Conservatives pooh-poohing individual liberty and freedom. The are just some of the political side-effects of the debate over physician-assisted suicide in the wake of the 9th Circuit's opinion last week telling the Justice Department (and John Ashcroft personally) to take a hike and leave Oregonians and their Death With Dignity Act alone. Today's on-line Wall Street Journal surveys the political wreckage (requires subscription), and helpfully provides links to various commentators:

• Associated Press article;


• Newsday editorial;


• Seattle Post Intelligencer editorial;


• spokeswoman for American Catholic Bishops Conference;
and

• editorial in LifeNews.com.

NY Times' extensive coverage of life and death under Oregon's PAS law.

The New York Times has a series of articles today about the reality of living and dying under Oregon's physician-assisted suicide law. The lead article is here. There is also a multimedia presentation on the voices of the terminally ill, which links off the main story page, and a brief story (with photos) of a woman who invited her friends in to experience her death together.

More on partial-birth abortion ruling.

Here's the essence of Judge Hamilton's ruling this morning (see below).

1. The partial-birth abortion law is unconstitutional in three respects.
a. The statutory definition of the procedure could apply to previability D&E procedures as well as inductions. It could also apply to the interventions performed by physicians who treat a woman experiencing a spontaneous second-trimester miscarriage. Physicians may face criminal prosecution under the statute for procedures than cannot always be predicted when they begin to treat their patients. This could reduce the availability of such procedures and could have an adverse impact on the physicians who continue to do the procedures. All of this amounts to an "undue burden," as that phrase has been explained in Casey and Stenberg: the law "has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." The Nebraska law at issue in Stenberg was struck down for the same reason.
b. The law is unconstitutionally vague in two material respects: "partial-birth abortion has little if any medical significance; "living fetus" adds to the vagueness of the law because it does not pertain to viability or to the framework of Roe and Casey; and neither the "overt act" nor the scienter requirements of the statute save the law from unconstitutional vagueness.
c. Notwithstanding the extensive findings of Congress to the contrary, the Court concluded that the intact D&E procedure (referred to in Stenberg as "D&X" or "dilation and extraction") is relatively safe, and it may be safer than any of the alternative procedures under some circumstances. Therefore banning the procedure could endanger women's health. The Nebraska law at issue in Stenberg was struck down for the same reason.

2. The extensive Congressional findings in support of Congress' conclusion that intact D&E is never necessary for the health of the mother were reviewed by the court under an intermediate review standard, neither de novo (as the plaintiffs argued) nor with the extreme deference sought by the government's lawyers. Applying a standard akin to a "hard look," the court concluded that these findings were "unreasonable and . . . not supported by substanttial evidence [that] was available to Congress at the time."

Federal court declares partial-birth abortion law unconstitutional.

At 9:00am this morning, Federal District Judge Phyllis Hamilton issued a 117-page order permanently enjoining the enforcement of the federal partial-birth abortion law. The order is here (PDF); the statute may be viewed here.

As reported this morning by the San Francisco Chronicle:

The ruling applies to the nation's 900 or so Planned Parenthood clinics and their doctors, who perform roughly half of all abortions in the United States.

U.S. District Judge Phyllis Hamilton's ruling came in one of three lawsuits challenging the legislation President Bush signed last year. . . .

Federal judges in New York and Nebraska also heard challenges to the law earlier this year but have yet to rule. . . .

Late last year, Hamilton, a Clinton appointee, and federal judges in New York and Lincoln, Neb., blocked the act from being enforced pending the outcome of the court challenges. They began hearing testimony March 29. . . .

The Nebraska and New York cases are expected to conclude within weeks. The outcomes, which may conflict with one another, will almost certainly be appealed to the Supreme Court.

The New York case was brought by the National Abortion Federation, which represents nearly half the nation's abortion providers. The Nebraska case was brought by a few abortion doctors.

Alan Morrison . . . living greatly in the law.

Alan Morrison is closing shop at the Public Citizen Litigation Group in Washington and leaving for a teaching job at Stanford, according to an article in the May 24th Legal Times (requires paid subscription; also available on WestLaw). This is the lawyer who brought us Virginia Pharmacy Board, Chadha, Bowsher, Mistretta, and the motion to recuse Justice Scalia from the Cheney energy case (which Scalia denied, but which probably led to Chief Justice Rehnquist's recent announcement that he has created a panel to look into judicial ethics on the high court).

Morrison's bold attempt to get Scalia out of the Cheney case is illustrative of his career:

The episode captures an essential truth about Morrison, one of the nation's top public interest lawyers, as he looks back over his 32 years with the Ralph Nader-founded Public Citizen Litigation Group. He is fearless about challenging government and corporate interests, yet also has no fear of befriending -- or at least being cordial to -- their advocates and icons.

"There's no reason not to deal with people in a civil manner," Morrison says. "I don't consider myself a rebel. I like having people return my phone calls."

Even in his parting, a range of luminaries returned his phone calls and formed a host committee for a June 3 farewell dinner for Morrison that will also fund a fellowship in his name. The list spans the spectrum of the legal establishment -- from former Whitewater Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr to Harvard Law School professor Laurence Tribe, Reagan Solicitor General Charles Fried to Clinton SG Seth Waxman, Reagan White House Counsel Fred Fielding to Clinton Chief of Staff John Podesta. "Alan Morrison is deeply respected throughout the entire Washington community," says Starr, now partner in the D.C. office of Kirkland & Ellis. "His conservative friends may not always agree with him, but they know he is a person of complete intellectual honesty."

For my students, the closing words of the article are memorable:

Throughout his career, Morrison says, he was never tempted by the astronomically higher salaries he could have made if he had put his tenacity and litigating skills to work for a private firm. At Public Citizen he was paid no more than $80,000 a year, he says, and even when he supplemented that with an adjunct law school teaching gig, "I'm still making less than a first-year associate at a New York firm."

But Morrison says the rewards have been incomparable. Pointing to Craig's book about the litigation group's early days, he says, "I hope young people read it and say to themselves, 'You know, there's a better way to spend my life.' You work here, and there's no competition, you don't have to make partner." One young lawyer on his staff once told him the job was so fulfilling and fun, "I don't think we should get paid."

Morrison recalls the words of his friend the late public interest activist Joseph Rauh Jr., who once said, "They made all the money; we had all the fun."

New Texas Supreme Court case on workers' comp.

Texas Workers' Compensation Commission v. Patient Advocates of Texas, No. 02-0804, decided May 28:

In 1989, the Legislature enacted a new Workers’ Compensation Act in response to rising medical costs and increasing insurance premiums. The Legislature created the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission and gave the agency broad powers to adopt rules necessary for the implementation and enforcement of the Workers’ Compensation Act. TEX. LAB. CODE § 402.061. One of TWCC’s new functions was to establish fee guidelines for reimbursements to health care providers who treat injured workers. Id. § 413.011. To this end, the agency promulgated the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Medical Fee Guideline 1996, adopted by reference in Rule 134.201 of the Texas Administrative Code. See 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 134.201 (indicating that copies of the Guideline may be obtained from TWCC’s publication department). The Guideline contains the maximum allowable reimbursements (MARs) for thousands of medical procedures. The MARs establish upper limits on the amount of reimbursements payable to health care providers for the listed treatments or services. TWCC also promulgated a set of rules, now commonly referred to as the “Dispute and Audit Rules,” which establish a process for insurance carriers to review and audit bills submitted by health care providers. Id. §§ 133.301-.305.2 The rules also set up dispute resolution procedures to resolve disagreements over the necessity of medical procedures and the amount of reimbursements. Id. § 133.305. Requests for medical dispute resolution must be filed not later than one year from the date of the medical service. Id. § 133.305(d).

TWCC’s adoption of the Guideline and the Dispute and Audit Rules are at the base of this dispute. Patient Advocates of Texas and Allen J. Meril, M.D. (collectively PAT) initiated this lawsuit claiming that TWCC did not follow the rulemaking procedures required by statute when promulgating the Guideline. Additionally, PAT asserts that TWCC exceeded its rulemaking authority by setting a ceiling on many medical fee reimbursements and limiting the time for a party to seek medical dispute resolution to one year from the date the medical service was provided. PAT also challenges the validity of the Dispute and Audit Rules alleging that TWCC illegally delegated its audit and fee-setting authority to private insurance carriers. Lastly, PAT raises constitutional challenges to the rules on the grounds that the MARs and the one-year time limitation constitute a taking of their property without due process and just compensation. In response, TWCC argues that its enactment of the Guideline meets statutory procedural requirements and the limits placed on medical payments are consistent with the agency’s authority to establish medical policies and guidelines pursuant to section 413.011 of the Labor Code. TWCC claims that it retains its power to audit workers’ compensation participants and establish medical fees, and that the Dispute and Audit Rules are simply a means to facilitate insurance carriers’ review of the medical claims submitted by health care providers.

The Supreme Court concludes "that TWCC complied with the statutory requisites for promulgating the fee guidelines and acted within its designated powers in limiting specified medical fee reimbursements and the time to seek medical dispute resolution. We affirm the court of appeals’ judgment on these issues. Because we conclude that TWCC did not delegate its power to private entities, we reverse the portion of the court of appeals’ judgment that is contrary to this conclusion. We also overrule the constitutional challenge to TWCC’s fee reimbursement guidelines and time limitations for commencing medical dispute resolution."

Radicalized elders turn to drug smuggling.

Good article by Elisabeth Weil in today's N.Y. Times re: groups of elders who engage in illegal prescription drug reimportation. The piece is entitled "Grumply Old Drug Smugglers."

Harvard Medical amends conflict-of-interest policies

Trend-setter Harvard Medical School has amended its conflict policy for researchers, acording to an article in The Boston Globe.

Under the policy, Harvard faculty cannot own more than $30,000 in stock from public companies that benefit from their research, a $10,000 increase from the previous limit. They cannot have any stock from companies with which they have ongoing research collaborations. In addition, faculty members cannot own stock in private companies related to their research. But faculty can receive up to $20,000 in consulting fees from companies tied to their research, also a $10,000 increase from the previous limit. . . .

Until now, faculty could not hold upper management jobs in firms. The new policy extends this prohibition to include the positions of chief scientific officer and chief medical officer, slots Harvard faculty occasionally accept.

The new policy was crafted by Harvard medical dean Dr. Joseph B. Martin, in consultation with several faculty committees. He noted that some faculty members argued for looser rules that would foster increased interaction with Boston's vibrant biotechnology and pharmaceutical communities.

''The issues that some individuals raised were set aside for two reasons: that we need to protect human subjects in research . . . and that there not be any perception of bias in research work," he said.

But of faculty collaborations with industry, Martin said: ''We encourage it in every possible way." The increase in the stock and consulting limits, said Martin, reflected what he thought ''responsible people ought to be able to take in."

The Office of Public Health and Science at HHS published its own guidance on this subject on May 12.

Monkey business affects waiting times on transplant list in Albany.

Modern Healthcare's Daily Dose is reporting (alternate link) that yesterday the New York Health Department "fined Albany (N.Y.) Medical Center Hospital $18,000 for falsely reporting patient information in its heart-transplant program. The state accused the 576-bed academic medical center of exaggerating the seriousness of patient conditions to move transplant candidates higher on the transplant waiting list." Need it be added that this type of manipulation of the system only breeds fear and mistrust of transplantation programs?

Maternal-fetal conflicts: a moving target.

The Associated Press had a good article this week on a raft of recent cases in which authorities of one kind or another have come into conflict with pregnant women and the decisions they made concerning childbirth. Here's a link to the CNN publication of the story, which should be pretty stable for the next few months or years.

Interesting intersection of universal health care coverage, same-sex marriage, and domestic-partners' benefits

There is an Associated Press story out (published in today's Portsomouth (N.H.) Herald) about my hometown, Springfield, Mass. The article reports that Springfield is dropping health benefits for same-sex unmarried domestic partners of city employees. Cost is an obvious culprit, but there is also the issue of Massachusetts' decision to allow same-sex marriages. Now that this option is legally available, the city seems to be saying, what's the justification for domestic-partner benefits?

As pointed out in the article, however, same-sex couples may decide to remain unmarried in order to adopt children in countries than ban adoptions by married same-sex couples. And Springfield's three-month phase-out may leave out in the cold those couples that cannot (or choose not to) get their marital act together that quickly. Mayor Charlie Ryan (who was also mayor during my high school days, 37 years ago, and whom I always regarded as an exceptionally straight shooter) says his new order will bring the city into compliance with state insurance laws, though that didn't seem to be a high priority until now.

As for cost: Cambridge Vice-mayor Marjorie Decker is quoted as saying, "It’s an interesting debate for any city or town," she said. "We’re at the crossroads of what happens when you don’t have some universal form of health care." Cambridge, as well as other employers, is confronting the same choices:

Decker expects the city will eventually debate the issue. She predicts that some will argue that domestic-partnership benefits should be extended to all couples who are in long-term committed relationships, rather than forcing them to marry in order to access health benefits. . . .

Among Boston-area employers, Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center and Babson College will discontinue domestic-partner benefits at the end of the year.

Employers including Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Brigham and Women’s Hospital, Massachusetts General Hospital, Fidelity Investments, Gillette Co. and EMC Corp. will maintain the benefits. Harvard University plans to maintain them for the immediate future, but will revisit the issue in the next two years.

Stay tuned . . . .

Physician-Assisted Suicide.

I am no great fan of legalizing physician-assisted suicide (PAS). But once a state has gone down that road, as Oregon has with its Death With Dignity law, it's exceedingly important for the federal government to get out of the way and not impose its pro-life political stance on states that see things a little differently. Just as this administration has done with California's experiment with medical marijuana, it has tried to squelch the Oregon initiative by leveraging its enforcement powers under the Controlled Substances Act. And just as it did last December in the California medical-marijuana case (Raich v. Ashcroft), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit last week hammered the Department of Justice for its use of the Controlled Substances Act, this time to interfere with Oregon's experiment with PAS. In State of Oregon v. Ashcroft, the judges scolded the Attorney General for "violating the plain language of the CSA, contravening Congress’ express legislative intent, and overstepping the bounds of the Attorney General’s statutory authority." Its concluding paragraph is sweeping in its condemnation of Ashcroft's attempt to impose his personal morality on the citizens of Oregon:

In sum, the CSA was enacted to combat drug abuse. To the extent that it authorizes the federal government to make decisions regarding the practice of medicine, those decisions are delegated to the Secretary of Heath and Human Services, not to the Attorney General. The Attorney General’s unilateral attempt to regulate general medical practices historically entrusted to state lawmakers interferes with the democratic debate about physician assisted suicide and far exceeds the scope of his authority under federal law. We therefore hold that the Ashcroft Directive is invalid and may not be enforced.

The irony in all this is that this most avowedly pro-State, anti-federalist administration hasn't hesitated to try to impose its will on the states when it perceived a hint of political mileage that might be gained with the far right, even when it means shamelessly trampling individual liberties and the traditional role of the states in regulating the practice of medicine.

Prisoner Abuse and Doctors' Duty.

Over the past few years, a couple of medical journals have quite regularly published articles on the torture and abuse of prisoners and detainees and the duty of physicians. Among the most active on this topic have been JAMA, Annals of Internal Medicine, Lancet, and BMJ; a PubMed search for articles with "torture" in the title turns up 589 hits. Until now, it's been easy to dismiss those articles as being of little relevance to most American physicians, let alone the general public. But as a letter in today's NY Times reminds us, "military doctors at Abu Ghraib returned several times to 'stitch wounds, tend to collapsed prisoners or see patients with bruised or reddened genitals' ('Only a Few Spoke Up on Abuse as Many Soldiers Stayed Silent,' front page, May 22). . . . As a medical student, I know that under those circumstances, any doctor should have known that torture was going on in the prison. The fact that those physicians did not speak up constitutes an abandonment of their duties both as soldiers and as doctors."

Texas Supreme Court decides informed-consent case.

In one of its famously tardy decisions (argued April 23, 2003; decided May 7, 2004), the Texas Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Owen (frequently the author of famously tardy opinions), unanimously held last week in Binur v. Jacobo, No. 02-0405, that "an erroneous prognosis that is the basis for recommending surgery cannot be the basis of a cause of action for lack of informed consent." Plaintiff claimed that she never would have consented to a bilateral mastectomy if her doctor hadn't erroneously and negligently opined that she was going to develop breast cancer. The court ruled that the risk of an erronoeous diagnosis or prognosis is not the type of risk the Legislature and the Texas Disclosure Panel require to be disclosed. Relying on the List A disclosures for radical or modified radical mastectomy, the Court noted that the required disclosures include the following:

(A) Limitation of movement of shoulder and arm.
(B) Swelling of the arm.
(C) Loss of the skin of the chest requiring skin graft.
(D) Recurrence of malignancy, if present.
(E) Decreased sensation or numbness of the inner aspect of the arm and chest wall.

None of the risks listed for this or any other procedure on List A include the risk that the physician's diagnosis or prognosis that supports his or her recommendation that the procedure be performed is or may be incorrect. If a physician told a patient that she had cancer and was therefore recommending a hysterectomy, the risks enumerated by the Texas Disclosure Panel do not include the risk that the surgery may be unnecessary. The risk that a physician may have erroneously made a diagnosis or prognosis as a predicate to recommending surgery is not inherent in any particular surgery or procedure or medication. That is a general risk of consulting a physician.

This opinion is consistent with those of four Texas courts of appeals. The Supreme Court emphasized that the negligent diagnosis or prognosis could give rise to a negligence claim, but in this case the plaintiff had waived those claims over the course of the litigation. It probably doesn't need to be emphasized that the consent process may be flawed, irredeemably so, when the practitioner affirmatively misleads the patient with statements that are known to be false, simply to procure a consent.

IRS ruling a template for hospital-physician deals.

As reported yesterday by Modern Healthcare, the IRS has issued Revenue Ruling 2004-51, which lays out the ground rules for nonprofit health care providers who want to go into ancillary joint ventures with for-profit entities. According to the story:

The five-page revenue ruling offers a template for how not-for-profit hospitals can protect their tax-exempt status and avoid paying unrelated-business income taxes in joint ventures with physicians or for-profit companies. . . .

[A] tax-exempt university asked for IRS guidance on its plan to offer training programs for elementary and secondary schoolteachers. The university would team up with a for-profit, interactive-video company in a 50-50 joint venture, with each partner naming three directors to the board. The governance agreement would prohibit activities contrary to the university's tax-exempt status, require the university to remain at arm's length in negotiations for contracts and other transactions, and establish fair-market value as a benchmark for prices.

The IRS said those stipulations would protect the university's tax-exempt status, and there would be no unrelated-business income taxes because the venture was an extension of the university's educational mission and insubstantial compared with its overall activity.

Schiavo timeline and significant documents.

Thanks are due to professors Steven Haidar and Kathy Cerminara for putting together a most useful timeline for the Schiavo case. My only suggestion for an additional citation is to the actual session law version of Terri's Law: chapt. 2003-418. The timeline is otherwise an altogether admirable and useful attempt to pull together everything a person might want to know about the history of this sad, sad case.