The piece is written by Clayton Dalton, identified as an ER physician in New Mexico. His personal website has links to other published essays, including a bunch of New Yorker articles. If you're not a subscriber to the magazine, he might have the ECMO piece posted on his website sometime soon.
Also missing are a feature of the AHA Guidelines for resuscitation in adults: a section on decisions to withhold resuscitation based upon a futility determination.
The thing is, CPR is ineffective at treating the underlying condition that is bringing about the patient's death. And even as a stop-gap to allow treatments to take effect, it mostly works in a small cohort of patients:
CPR can save lives when patients are relatively healthy, and when the cause of their death is reversible or unclear. Damar Hamlin, the Buffalo Bills player whose heart stopped during a nationally televised game in January, typifies the person for whom CPR was invented: young and fit, and the victim of a sudden, treatable injury rather than a progressive disease. Still, less than ten percent of people who receive CPR outside a hospital survive. Inside hospitals, where CPR begins quickly, the odds are slightly better, but only for those who aren’t in the last stages of life. A mere two per cent of adults over sixty-seven with severe chronic disease, including cancer, are alive six months after CPR, and they often deal with pain, physical debility, and post-traumatic stress disorder. Reversing a death is not the same as restoring a life.
And yet doctors, including a younger version of the author, often give families the choice of performing CPR or not without offering the grim statistical chance of failure, giving the impression that they are choosing between life or death. Families and physicians alike are traumatized in these situations because the truth is not easy to discuss.
Texas is one of the few states in the country that offers legal protection for physicians who resist requests for medically inappropriate treatment (Ch. 166, Tx. Health & Safety Code). It was amended in 2017 to add Subchapter E, which may fairly be characterized as hostile to do-not-resuscitate (DNR) orders. The unfortunate result has been to sow confusion and doubt about when a hospital DNR order may be written and, once written, when it may or may not be followed. The need for such a law was dubious at the time, and although amendments have provided some clarity, Subchapter E stands as a prime example of the unwisdom of legislatures prescribing standards of care.
Thad Pope has a useful post on this subject. There are direct medical costs (estimated at $2,700/day (Ottawa study) to $4,000/day (UCLA study)), but equally if not more concerning "may be (a) the opportunity cost when other patients are denied ICU care, (b) moral distress of the nursing staff, and (c) suffering inflicted on the patient."
None of this seems to matter to the legislators in Texas who try, every legislative session, to gut the provisions of the Texas Advance Directives Act that were added in 1999 to deal with disputes over medically inappropriate treatment. The provisions are at Tex. Health & Safety Code § 166.046. The purpose of the law was to provide a nonjudicial mechanism for resolving these disputes. The key provision is in subsection (d), which -- after reasonable efforts over a 10-day period to find a provider willing to provide the treatment requested by the surrogate decision-maker fail to identify a provider willing to accept transfer of the patient -- permits the disputed treatment to be withheld or withdrawn.
The objectors in the legislature want to replace that 10-day process with a provision that requires the health care providers to "treat until transfer." This benign-sounding idea would mean that, in the vast majority of cases in which no transferee provider can be found, medically inappropriate treatment must be provided until death occurs, which may be months or even years later. A current example is the Tinslee Lewis case in Fort Worth, which has been in litigation for over two years. According to a motion filed by defendant Cook Children's Hospital,
a review of Tinslee’s case was initiated by third-party administrator Aetna’s Special Investigative Unit, which has requested all of Tinslee’s records. The Special Investigative Unit’s mandate under Medicaid regulations is to investigate “waste, abuse, and fraud,” the motion says.
“In Cook Children’s experience, such reviews are often precursors to efforts to deny payment or even claw back funds previously paid,” the motion said.
The briefs for and against the lower court's ruling, which -- though not disposing of the constitutionality question -- gave a very strong indication of its inclination to strike down the law, are here. It probably goes without saying, as someone who worked (with many others, including National Right Life and Texas Right to Life, before they changed their mind about the law) to draft this law more than 20 years ago, that I am persuaded by the briefs that argue to uphold the law, which passed both houses of the state legislature without a single nay vote.
