Chevron Deference: Its Diminished Role (and Imminent Demise?)

The Chevron doctrine says that federal courts will defer to agency interpretations of federal statutes as long as the statute in question is either silent or ambiguous on the subject in question and as long as the agency interpretation is "reasonable." 

Note first the weasel words in my description of the Chevron doctrine:

• ambiguous: When is a statute ambiguous? Language is inherently ambiguous, and law schools train students to find ambiguity and exploit it for their clients whenever possible. Ambiguity is often in the eye of the beholder. Post-Chevron cases amply illustrate that the Supreme Court can split 5-4 over this very question.
• reasonable: The most overused word in the entire legal lexicon. What one judge regards as a reasonable interpretation may strike another judge as an outrageous overreach by the agency.

The result of the subjective nature of key terms in the Chevron doctrine has been controversy over the legitimacy of the doctrine itself. In fact, if memory serves, the very next agency case after the Court's decision in Chevron was decided without so much as a reference to Chevron. And since then, the Court has engrafted exceptions to the Chevron doctrine -- up to an including the Court's current fondness for striking down agency decisions by applying the Major Question Doctrine, itself a controversial development. ("What does "major" mean? Is it entirely in the eye of the beholder?)

A trusted source tells me the Court hasn't actually relied on Chevron in an agency case since 2014. That hasn't stopped conservative members of the Court who are unhappy about the "activist" policy choices of certain agencies' progressive agendas from expressing their disapproval of Chevron deference.

A number of cases are presently before the Court this term that may lead to a 6-3 or at least 5-4 disavowal of Chevron once and for all. One is Garland v. Cargill, No. 22-976, which raises the question whether a bump stock device is a “machinegun” as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b). The Justice Department says yes, and Michael Cargill argues that is wrong. Maybe the statute is unambiguous, in which case Chevron by its terms would not apply at all. The government, perhaps cannily, does not argue for Chevron deference in its principal brief on the merits and argues against Chevron deference in its reply brief (at p. 20):

4. Respondent next argues (Br. 48-50) that this Court does not owe deference to ATF’s interpretation under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  But as the government has explained (Br. 43), it does not seek any such deference here because ATF’s regulation is not a legislative rule carrying the force and effect of law; instead, it is simply an interpretive rule announcing ATF’s understanding of the statute.  That should be the end of the matter.  See HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining v. Renewable Fuels Ass’n, 141 S. Ct. 2172, 2180 (2021) (“ ‘[T]he government is not invoking Chevron.’  * * *  We therefore decline to consider whether any deference might be due its regulation.”) (citation omitted).  

Probably the best cases for a showdown over Chevron's continued existence involve a regulation involving fisheries, as discussed in a free article in JAMA posted to its website today:

Two cases currently before the US Supreme Court, Loper Bright Enterprises v Raimondo and Relentless, Inc v Department of Commerce, could potentially lead to the end of Chevron. Six commercial fishing ventures have challenged a rule requiring that fishermen pay the cost of government-approved observers who guard against illegal overfishing. Although the lower courts in both cases upheld the regulation under Chevron, the fisheries contend that the rule and Chevron itself are threatening the way of life for small, family-owned businesses. Justice Gorsuch was receptive, expressing concern during oral arguments that Chevron places a thumb on the scale in favor of the government at the expense of “the immigrant, the veteran seeking his benefits, the Social Security Disability applicant, who have no power to influence Agencies.” Justice Kavanaugh, meanwhile, noted that the historic role of the judiciary has been “to police the line between the legislature and the executive to make sure that the executive is not operating as a king,” seemingly implying that Chevron places agencies in the position of royalty.

Why does JAMA care? Because of the critical role of the federal government, acting through agency rules and decisions, to protect the health of the public:

From health care to climate change, federal agencies were created to marshal the resources and power of the government to improve the lives of individuals in the US. A longstanding pillar supporting these agencies, a legal doctrine called Chevron deference, grants them flexibility in carrying out their mandates to maximize policy impact and keeps them nimble amid changing circumstances. Now, a majority of the US Supreme Court, led most vocally by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, appears poised to overturn this bedrock principle. The loss of Chevron could exalt policy choices made by judges over the expertise-based decisions by executive agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).