Have IRBs Become Compliance Bureaucracies?

Professor Sarah Babb (Sociology Professor, Boston College) has a new book -- Regulating Human Research: IRBs from Peer Review to Compliance Bureaucracy (Standford Univ. P. 2020). It is reviewed well by Edward Dove (Lecturer in Health Law and Regulation, University of Edinburgh Law School) in Jotwell -- Health Law (6/9/2020). Dove's bottom line: "In sum, Babb’s book is a welcome addition to the scholarship on research ethics governance. For those interested in this area of health law, it is a must-read."

Dove's restatement of Professor Babb's thesis, based upon her experience on the B.C. IRB and extensive interviews, is this: 

IRBs have transformed since the late 1990s from committees of peer reviewers – fellow academics making ethical judgements on the basis of scholarly expertise, but paying little attention to the letter of the regulations—to “compliance bureaucracies,” wherein full-time IRB administrators do much of the heavy lifting, often behind the scenes. Babb defines compliance bureaucracy as “a nongovernmental office that uses skilled staff—compliance professionals—to interpret, apply, and oversee adherence to government rules” (P. 5.) In this transformed governance environment, faculty board members still participate in terms of voting on whether to approve a project or expedited research protocols, but their work is simply not possible without IRB staff. This transformation, Babb argues, was due primarily to the growth in IRB scrutiny in the late 1990s by the Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP), which is situated in the federal Department of Health and Human Services. In turn, there was consequential growth in funding from research institutions to invest in IRB administration to better manage the risk associated with OHRP audits and enforcement actions. IRBs today are led not by peer reviewers, then, but rather a professionalized service of research administrators who know the nuances of IRB management. 

Based upon my experience as a member of four IRBs over the past 35 years, Professor Dove 's thesis may be based upon a false dichotomy. While The Common Rule, which is based upon the Belmont Report, is indeed a thick (in all senses of the word) document that reflects the bureaucratic mind at work, much of this bureaucratese emanates from ethical concerns that are central to the IRB's mission. When are a research program's risks sufficiently low that the IRB can pass on the proposal without any review? Or with a mere "expedited review"? Protection of research subjects depends upon the answers to these questions, as well as others: 

• Does the research protocol focus on minors? Prisoners? Other "vulnerable" subjects? 
• If so, what additional safeguards need to be built into the review process to help ensure the subjects are treated ethically? 
• Is there some human research that just shouldn't be done? 
• Are the fundamental human rights of research subjects sufficiently protected by the design of the research and the disclosure of risks?

The bureaucratic Common Rule, and the professional staff that guides IRB members through the compliance process, is intended to provide consistent answers to questions such as these. Our experience in the United States during much of the 20th century gives little reason to believe researchers should be left to decide these questions for themselves.